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1. Introduction
The dependence of human 
communities on environmental 
conditions is manifested in rules, 
regulations and standards, based 
on local experience, customs, ob-
servations and research. Howev-
er, some environmental impacts 
exceed local communities, coun-
try boundaries, and experience 
with them has led to similar 
or conventional procedures for 
more effective adaptation and 
mitigation.
Phenomena that have signif-
icant environmental impacts on 
human communities can be of 
either natural or human origin. 
These effects can also impact more 
remote areas through natural or 
human activities. In the past, in-
ternational agreements were creat-
ed to prevent or to give remedy the 
harmful consequences.
However, there have been no 
large-scale environmental im-
pacts that would have required 
more comprehensive consulta-
tions between countries in recent 
decades. The development of en-
vironmental monitoring systems, 
the results of scientific research 
on the natural environment, and 
the formation of international co-
operation organizations have cre-
ated the possibility of recognizing 
regional and then global environ-
mental risks and common inter-
ests. At the same time, economic 
activities have reached such a level 
that some of their consequences 
can even change the state of the 
environment of the Earth.
2. Materials and Methods
In this paper the results are 
based on the secondary research. 
The data, processed in the re-
search, were collected from sever-
al international public databases. 
The literature review focuses on 
different approaches from sever-
al international researchers.
3. Results
A de facto ‚framework’ of international environmental law 
and governance has widely been recognized [1–4]. However this 
recognition has not always existed. From the fourteenth century 
on the European continent, environmental co-operation devel-
oped cautiously through bilateral agreements (between England 
and Portugal, England and France, etc.) for the management of 
fishery resources. Several of those deals examined the access 
to some territories and rivers in Europe and North America 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition to 
these specific resource and terri-
torial agreements, it was only in 
the nineteenth century that the 
environment took on a decidedly 
multilateral dimension.
Nonetheless, bilateral efforts 
are frequently inadequate to 
handle endangered, non-exclu-
sive, non-rival, public goods. In 
fact, most of the tools and main 
environmental concerns do not 
know boundaries. In 1857, the 
first multilateral agreement – 
which involved more than three 
countries – committed states 
bordering Lake Constance to 
handle the water pumping of 
the lake. During the nineteenth 
century, multilateral agreements 
gradually developed and began 
to address environmental issues 
more directly, such as the trans-
port of hazardous substances or 
the protection of endangered 
species [5].
Following the incremental 
emergence of environmental ag- 
reements in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, major envi-
ronmental summits took place, 
in particular the 1972 Stockholm 
Summit, for the environment to 
assume its true global signifi-
cance, and for environmental 
diplomacy to turn to the conser-
vation of the world’s natural re-
sources rather than merely their 
management.
Other summits, held every 
ten years after the 1972 summit, 
set the stage for environmental 
diplomacy [6] provide an oppor-
tunity to take stock, formulate 
general concepts, embedded in 
official statements and establish 
international organizations, com-
mitted to the environment [7]. 
The 1972 Stockholm Summit, or 
United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment, was the 
first climate-focused multilateral 
summit. The summit has been 
one of the largest international 
conferences ever held, thanks to the active participation of 
developed countries. In 1992 a second Summit, the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, was 
held in Rio to reinforce the progress, achieved in Sweden. 
The summit reiterated the environmental-development link-
ages. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, which 
took place in Johannesburg in 2002, shifted partly from en-
vironmental goals, opening the door to non-state players.
While the 1972 United Nations Conference (UNCHE) is 
frequently viewed as having kick-started international environ-
mental law [8], by 1950, states had signed over 250 IEAs. Fig. 1 
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An international environmental agreement is a kind of treaty 
that is binding in international law, allowing them to accom-
plish an environmental goal. Bilateral environmental agree-
ment is defined as an agreement between two countries. If the 
agreement is signed between three or more nations it is called 
a Multilateral Environmental Agreement. These agreements, 
mainly drawn up by the United Nations, include issues, such 
as environmental policies, freshwater policies, hazardous waste 
and material policies, aquatic environment, wildlife conserva-
tion policies, noise pollution and nuclear safety. 
International agreements set a number of objectives: Informal 
agreements may formulate action plans for sovereign states or 
international institutions; they may establish or alter interna-
tional organizations or bodies; and legally binding agreements 
may demand that sovereign states change their actions.
Least developed countries face significant challenges in terms 
of mitigation and adaptation, which must be resolved by suc-
cessful agreements. A state government may wish to abide 
by an agreement but lacks the power to do so. Some climate 
agreements build in frameworks for promoting implementa-
tion and enforcement through technology transfer, funding 
and technical support. Agreements can facilitate the process of 
forging a common vocabulary and a mutual knowledge of an 
issue. States have often taken steps within their own jurisdic-
tions which foreshadow what they are prepared to agree inter-
nationally. The balance of power is increasingly shifting, giving 
rise to questions about the successful functioning of foreign re-
gimes. This current multi-polarity also deepens cleavages over 
the nature of agreements. The financial crisis spurred consen-
sus on institutional reform; adapting international architecture 
to better represent the dynamics of contemporary power. The 
emerging and developing economies have concluded agree-
ments in the environmental problem field to promote mitiga-
tion and adaptation assistance to the least developed countries.
This present paper analyzes the development, function and the 
problems of these agreements.
Keywords: multilateral, bilateral, international law, United Na-
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shows the five-year moving average of signed original agree-
ments, protocols and amendments, showing states, agreeing far 
more original bilateral environmental agreements (BEAs) than 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), but chang-
ing them less regularly through protocols and amendments. 
Around the time of UNCHE, states negotiated several BEAs, 
and both MEAs and BEAs around the time of the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development.
Fig. 1. Rates of Successfully Completed IEA Negotiations [11]
The total number of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) is impressive: Since 1945, more than 2,000 en-
vironmental agreements and protocols have been signed [9]. 
Some of the oldest IEAs regulate fisheries, endangered species, 
agriculture and wetlands, but a growing proportion of IEAs now 
tackles habitat protection, energy generation, hazardous waste, 
and pollutant emissions [10]. Subjects have continued to diver-
sify, with one third of IEAs now addressing animals, one third 
addressing emissions and energy, and the other third covering a 
number of other concerns (Fig. 2) [11].
Fig. 2. Share of Subjects Covered by MEAs and BEAs [11]
These treaties have no single institutional affiliation (e. g., 
to UN Environment), because the institutionalization of envi-
ronmental treaties in the international organizational landscape 
happened gradually. In certain cases, pre-existing international 
organizations preferred expanding their own areas of action 
rather than delegating that role to international environmental 
institutions [6].
Notwithstanding their distinct roots and institutional re-
lations, environmental treaties form a family of treaties under 
which numerous agreements have survived those provisions [12]. 
They include provisions, representing the main guidelines, high-
lighted at environmental summits (sustainable development, val-
ue of development, collaborations, etc.), as well as a range of more 
basic concepts, such as the precautionary principle, the principle 
of informed advance agreement, and common yet differentiated 
responsibilities [6].
4. Discussion
Multilateral environmental agreements are a dominant 
force in international environmental law. These MEAs result in 
long-standing reciprocal commitments and cooperation, create 
structures that coordinate research, explore new environmental 
policy frontiers and address the intersection of environmental 
concerns with development, human rights and trade. As trea-
ties, they constitute one of the most agreed sources of interna-
tional legal obligation. According to international law, a State, 
which has consented to be bound by a MEA in effect, is obliged 
to comply with it. Nevertheless, the image of a binding MEA as 
an expression of its parties’ approval is more complicated than 
it seems at first glance. Over the past few decades, these MEAs 
have formed a mode of operation that calls into question some 
of our understandings and assumptions about international 
legal obligations, particularly as they relate to treaty regimes. In 
the past three decades multilateral environmental agreements 
have proliferated rapidly. Indeed, measured by the number 
of MEAs, the time since World War II has been a remarkable 
success for multilateralism proponents [13], but the execution 
of these agreements has been less successful. Although several 
governments have been eager to join MEAs, evidence shows 
that they have not always completely fulfilled their legal respon-
sibilities to adopt supranational agreements, i. e. by integrating 
treaties into domestic law, enacting legislation, and developing 
an effective monitoring and compliance infrastructure.
As long as there is no supranational government in place, 
instead of engaging in multilateral agreements, an individual 
country has an incentive to free ride. After all, several of the 
agreements aim to offer public benefits on a national or global 
scale. Environmental agreements have addressed a wide variety of 
priorities, ranging from forest protection and water management 
to transboundary pollution regulation. In conclusion we can state 
that there are two features of these international environmental 
agreements. The most important is that IEAs are surprisingly 
weak agreements: they do not generally include mechanisms for 
enforcement or monitoring. The lack of enforcement is only part-
ly explained by the lack of enforcement by third parties in global 
politics; after all, the countries could sign treaties, where noncom-
pliance is met by trade sanctions [14]. The other feature of IEAs 
is that many of them, including some of the most prominent, 
are generally seen as ineffective[15].These two facts suggest that 
the paradox may be that so many countries are negotiating and 
signing weak agreements, rather than the number of agreements 
itself. Negotiating treaties is an expensive and laborious process; 
even more detrimental is the signing of treaties, which are either 
not ratified or ratified and then reneged on. We might call this 
the „Week Agreements Paradox.”
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